Let's get right to the heart of the matter: Stanford
basketball's big men aren't perceived quite the way they should
these days, and it's a matter of importance how this perception
carries to Stanford recruits. It's time to dispel the myth.
The myth is that Stanford is a plodding team that runs a
no-fun offense structured to mitigate individuals' talents. As
this pertains to post players, the recent macroevolution at
Stanford has been completely missed by the public eye, hiding
from the national view perhaps one of the most forward-thinking
centers of development in the country. The myth says that
Stanford plays its big boys down in the low post, banging all day
with their backs solely to the basket. The perimeter stuff is
supposedly left only to the wings, especially those with such a
knack for scoring like Casey Jacobsen. The truth is that Stanford
works hard every day to perfect the high post game with its big
men, maximizing their abilities facing the basket.
Case in point, look at Stanford's top three scoring post
players from just last year's roster: Jason Collins, Jarron
Collins and Curtis Borchardt. All three have shown the range to
play away from the basket, and thus have effectively had a green
light to stretch the defense and shoot from mid and long-range.
In the 2000-01 season, these three combined to shoot 44% from
behind the arc. If those three were a team, they would have led the
entire NCAA last year, while averaging 6'11" and still
dominating in the low post. As it stood, these sharp-shooting big
men, plus some lethal wings, guided Stanford to the second-best
three-point shooting percentage in the country. The bigs on the
Farm don't just bang - they bomb.
As a collective trio, they are impressive, but they have
remarkable individual stories of development and realized
potential as well. Jarron could have been a star center anywhere
in the country, but was a forward at Stanford and played
primarily facing the basket outside of the paint. His lethal
jump-shot around 14-feet was unstoppable by opposing power
forwards, to the tune of a 56% conversion. If he was just a
banger in the paint dominating smaller guys, you'd expect that
percentage. But he honed his range at a level that the NBA
couldn't ignore, as evidenced by the Utah Jazz' selection in this
June's NBA draft, a move signaling their hopes and plans for
Jarron as the successor to Karl Malone.
For Jason, the story is even more striking. Jason has an inch
on Jarron, and a bigger body perfectly suited for banging with
not just the premier posts in college, but also the biggest of
the bigs in the NBA. The only limitation for Jason at Stanford
had been his consecutive years of misfortune, where early
injuries forced him into medical redshirts his first two seasons.
As he regained his form in his first full year, he inched his way
back toward stamina and strength for the diverse role of a
Stanford post player. A post with bad knees but burgeoning
potential. Good health and exponential progress with the Stanford
coaching staff enabled him for a truly breakout year the
following season (2000-01). His ability to dominate defenders in
the low post was not much of a surprise, but he made a quantum
leap in his range. Whereas he shot just one three point attempt
(missed) in his first season, Jason absolutely broke out with a
46% year from deep, and 61% year from the field. In his most
classic game, he shot 4 of 5 from downtown and 13 of 14 overall.
With his body and obvious low post skills, it is hard to imagine
any other coaching staff in the country who could have enabled
that marked increase. From 0% to 46%!
How is it that these great giants are so adept facing the
basket? Certainly, their innate abilities have been core to their
productivity, but their growth has been engendered by a style of
play at Stanford that has really come on in the past two seasons.
Hidden to all but a few souls in the hoopaholic community is the
hard work Stanford displays in daily practices at running the
break to create the best high post situations for these guys.
I've watched as much as half of a practice spent honing the
execution of Stanford's fast break, in scrimmages and 5-on-0
drills. As with all schemes that Monty runs, the goal is to
create the best possible scoring opportunities. In Stanford's fast
break, the goal is to put a defense on their heels and create
high percentage openings. If the ball-handler can get to the
hoop, he will, but more often the lone/couple defenders will
deny. That should then leave an open wing and/or a trailing post
player arriving at the top of the three-point arc. The
ball-handler knows to look for one of those options, and the
recipients are expecting that shot.
Statistics will back-up the success of this coaching
philosophy, and again challenge the myth of the plodding Stanford
offense. The Cardinal executed to the tune of 83.3 points per
game last season, 6th best in the NCAA. More importantly, the
integration of tough defense that keys fastbreak, high percentage
offensive opportunities was revealed in a 18.9 point per game
margin of victory, 2nd best in the entire country. To reinforce
just how efficiently Monty's plan translates, look no further
than the team's 51.3% field goal percentage, #1 in the nation.
The greatest showcase of this execution would be the classic
comeback victory against Duke in December. Stanford stepped up
the defense, with the fruits of that labor coming in fantastic
offensive opportunities. A combination of fastbreaks, set
offense, transition offense and point-of-attack plays converted
no less than 14 straight possessions into buckets in college
basketball's game of the year.
The follow-up question may ask why this hasn't been as
prominent in Stanford teams past. The simple answer is that Monty
guides the offense toward the strengths of his players, and runs
the plays they can best execute. Prior to guys like Jason, Jarron
and Curtis, the Card just hasn't had a cast of bigs with that
range. When these talents came on board, Monty ran the offense to
give them the best chances to shine. As the next big man with
range looks to Stanford, he will have that same opportunity. The
only question is "Who?"
Other programs will surely tout their own successful big men,
with national recognition for their scoring away from the basket.
One such example is Notre Dame and recently departed Troy Murphy.
An All-American in his own right, he was a forward who scored at
will from long range. Interestingly, Murphy and the Collins Twins
all greatly elevated their perimeter games from the 1999-2000 to
2000-01 season. They, along with the elite in college post
players and many NBA posts, have gotten these results with the
help of the Pete Newell Big Man Camp each summer in Hawaii. A
primary focus of the camp is the footwork necessary for a post
player on the perimeter. A lot of stock is placed on the range of
a big man these days, so the value of this work is a big draw for
the best of both pro and college. You and many others around the
country may know of the Newell Camp and the great work done
there. But few realize that one of the prominent teachers at that
camp is Stanford assistant coach Eric Reveno, who brings his
Newell teaching skills to Stanford practices every day. Imagine
if Murphy had come to Stanford...
The only disappointment in all of this for Stanford fans is
the fact that there is this disconnect between perception and
reality. There are a myriad of reasons why there is such a gap,
one of which is ironically Stanford's outstanding defensive work.
A primary tenet of a Monty team is the essential defensive
ethic in his players, which was manifested in a new NCAA record two
seasons ago for team defense (FG%). The unknowing fan someho